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any change in the immunity doctrine should come from the legislature and not
the courts;9 (3) one court has reasoned that charitable institutions derive no
personal or private gain from the acts of thier servants and therefore they
should not be subjected to liability for their acts;1 ° (4) still other courts apply
the implied waiver theory that the patient assumes the risk of the employees
negligence, if reasonable care was used in the selection of the employees;".
(5) Louisiana favors the use of the public function theory, arguing that such
institutions are engaged in the performance of a public function, and there-
fore should be awarded-the same priviledges as other governmental agencies.'
2
It has also been held that attendants in charitable hospitals are not the servants
of the hospital under the master servant rule, but are the servants of the
patient while in his attendance.
13
The minority ruling is that a charitable institution is answerable for the
negligence of its employees and servants by the ordinary rules of agency, in-
cluding the principles of respondeat superior. 1 4 It is apparent that this minor-
ity rule is becoming the modem trend. 15 The major reason for this transition
is that charitable institutions are more financially solvent today than they
were when, the immunity doctrine was instituted; 16 thus stare decisis is not
standing in the way of progress.
A logical result was reached by the Illinois Supreme Court, 17 holding that
Charitable institutions were liable for the torts of their employees, and that the
judgment could not be collected from the trust fund, but must be levied on the
profits. This decision could seemingly satisfy both the immunity and non im-
rtunity arguments by taking the "middle of the road" approach.
A case similar to the instant case has never been before the North Dakota
courts, but in view of the Supreme Court's opinion in the case of Rickbiel v.
Grafton Deaconess Hospital's it is suggested that they may follow the minority
rule. 19
ROGER L. HOLTE.
WILLS - REVOCATION - EFFECT OF CONTRACT FOR SALE OF PREVIOUSLY
DEVISED REAL PROPERTY. - Decedent cxecuted a will in which he made specific
devises of real property to the defendants. Subsequently he executed a con-
tract for deed of the devised property. A declaratory judgment action was
brought by the executor to determine whether the devisees or the residuary
hlgatees receive the proceeds of the contract for deed. In reversing the Dis-
9. Forrest v. Red Cross Hospital, 265 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Ky. 1954) (dictum); Smith v.
Congregation of St. Rose, 265 Wis. 393, 61 N.W.2d 896, 898 (1954) (dictum).
10. See Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 160 N.W. 173 (1916).
11. St. Vincent's Hospital v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N.E. 537, 540 (1924) (dictum);
Williams v. Randolph Hospital, 237 N. C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303, 305 (1953) (dictum).
12. See lurjevic v. Hotel Dieu, 11 So.2d 632 (La. 1943).
13. See Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R. I. 22, 85 AtI. 120 (1912).
14. See, e.g., Swigerd v. City of Ortonville, 246 Minn. 339, 75 N.W.2d 217 (1956);
St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 212. Minn. 558, 4 N.W.2d 637
(1942); Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230 (1950).
15. See, e.g., Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 75, 267 P.2d 934 (1954);
Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n., 43 Wash.2d 162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953).
(Since 1950 eight states have repudiated the immunity doctrine).
16. Hayes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n., 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d 151 (1950).
Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 46 Del. 350, 83 A.2d 753. 758 (1950).
17. Moore v. Moyle, 405 11. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950).
18. 74 N. D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247, (1946).
19. Id. at 258, 259, 260.
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trict Court's reversal of the County Court, it was held, that under the N. D.
Rev. Code § 56-0411 (1943) 1 the sale did not revoke the.provision of the will
and that the devisees receive the remaining balance on the contract at the
death of the testator. Shure v. Dahl, 80 N.W.2d 825 (N. D. 1957).
At early common law, if a testator devised realty, and then entered into a
contract to sell that realty, the contract transferred the equitable interest to
the purchaser which, consequently, altered the testator's estate; and in equity,
operated as a revocation of the devise.2 This alteration occurred under the
doctrine of equitable conversion, which left the testator with a bare security
title.- As a result the devisees received the testator's legal interest and the
residuary legatees, received the proceeds of the contract as personalty. 4 A
similar result followed at common law, where a deceased's estate devolved by
intestate rules. There the heirs at law would receive the bare legal title and
the next of kin 5 would take the proceeds of the contract as presonalty.6
In 1837 England adopted the Wills Act 7 which contained specific provision
regarding the revocation of wills.8 The general provision on revocation specifi.-
cally stated that revocation should take place only in certain specified ways.9
Thereafter it is specifically provided that a conveyance would not revoke a
will.' o However, some English courts continued the practice of declaring a
will revoked by alteration of the estate,' 1 until 1861 when the English Wills'
Act was construed to prohibit revocation of wills, ,except by the specified
methods.12
New York enacted its version of the Wills Act with the same intent of
eliminating implied revocation of devisees.13 An early New York case held
1. "An agreement made by a testator for the sale or transfer of property disposed of
by a will previously made does not revoke such disposal, but the property passes by the
will, subject to the same remedies on the testator's agreement, for a specific performance or
otherwise, against the devisees or legatees, as might be had against the testator's successors
if the same had passed by succession."
2. See Mayer v. Gowland, Dick. 563, 21 Eng. Rep. 389 (Ch. 1779); 3 American
Law of Property, § 11.26 (Caser ed. 1952); Atkinson, Wills § 85 (2d ed. 1953).
3. See American Law of Property, supra note 2; Stone, Equitable Conversion By Con-
tract, 13 Col L. Rev. 369 (1913).
4. See Farrar v. Winterton, 5 Beav. 1, 49 Eng. Rep. 476 (Rolls Ct. 1844); Mayer v.
Gowland, Dick. 563, 21 Eng. Rep. 389 (Ch. 7179); 3 American Law of Property, 9 11.26
(Casner ed. 1952); 1 Tiffany, Real Property, § 310 (3d ed. 1939).
5. See N. D. Rev. Code § 56-0104 (1943) (there appears to be no distinction be-
tween heirs at law and next of kin.) See 3 Page, Wills § 1009, 1018 (3d ed. 1941) (for
the common law distinctions between heirs at law and next of kin)-
6. See Farrar v, Winterton, 5 Beav. 1, 49 Eng. Rep. 476 (Rolls Ct. 1844); 3
American Law of Property, § 11.26 (Casner ed. 1952); McClintock, Equity § 104 (1936).
7. Wills Act, 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26.
8. Id. 9§ 19-23.
9. Id. 9 20. ("No will or codicil, or any part thereof, shall be revoked otherwise
than as aforesaid, or by another will or codicil executed in manner hereinbefore required,
or by some writing declaring an intention to revoke the same, and executed in the manner
in which a will is hereinbefore required to be executed, or by the burning, tearing, or
otherwise destroying the same by the testator, or by some person in his presence and by
his direction, with the intention of revoking the same.")
10. Wills Act, 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Viet. c. 26 § 23. ("No conveyance or other act
made or done subsequently to the execution of a will of or relating to any real or personal
estate therein comprised, except an act by which such will shall be revoked as aforesaid,
shall prevent the operation of the will with respect to such estate or interest in such real
or personal estate as the testator shall have power to dispose of by will at the time of his
death.").
11. Farrar v. Winterton, 5 Beav. 1. 49 Eng. Rep. 476 (Rolls Ct. 1844).
12. Ford v. De Pontes, 30 Beav. 572, 54 Eng. Rep. 1012 (Rols Ct. 1861) ("... I
am of opinion that this question is concluded by the Wills Act . . . One great object of
that statute was to put an end to all those questions which previously arose where a
devise was destroyed by the alteration of the estate of the testator.").
13. N. Y. Decedent Estate Law, art. 2 (1950).
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that devises were revoked where there had been only a temporary alteration of
the estate. 14 That case was apparently overruled by a construction of the New
York statute 15 which is similar to the N. D. Rev. Code § 56-0411 (1943).
The court held that the New York statute under consideration prevented a
revocation of a devise of land later sold under an executory contract for
deed. 16 This New York decision seems to have been followed by virtually all
jurisdictions having a similar statute.' 7
In jurisdictions having a general revocation statute such as North Dakota,1s
New York, 19 and England,2° a specific revocation statute appears to be un-
necessary. Presumably the several legislatures adopted such statutes as safe-
guards to avoid judicial declarations of revocation when there had been an
inter vivos alteration of the testator's estate.
2 1
The respondents in the instant case relied heavily upon the North Dakota
case of Clapp v. Tower,2 2 in which the court applied the doctrine of equitable
conversion and treated the proceeds of the contract for deed as personalty.
However, in that case the decedent's will was void and unenforceable as to
realty. Therefore, the court did not have occassion to consider N. D. Rev.
Code § 56-0411 (1943) and the proceeds being personalty, were awarded to
the residuary legatees.
N. D. Rev. Code § 56-0411 (1943) appears to effectively prevent the doc-
trine of equitable conversion from working an implied revocation of a devise,
but the doctrine appears fully operative in every other respect. 23 The najority
of the jurisdictions construing similar statutes have given the doctrine of
equitable conversion full effect when dealing with interstate devolution of the
14. Walton v. Walton, 7 John Ch. 258, 2 N. Y. Ch. 256 (1823). (Where the testator
entered into a written contract for the sale of previously devised property and that contract
notwithstanding the testator reacquired the property.)
15. Knight v. Weatherwax, 7 Paige Ch. 182, 4 N. Y. Ch. 180 (1838); N. Y. Decedent
Estate Law, § 37 (1950). (A bond, agreement, or covenant, made for a valuable consider-
ation, by a testator, to convey any property devised or bequeathed in any will prveiously
made, shall not be deemed a revocation of such previous devise or bequest, either at law or
ins equity; but such property shall pass by the devise or bequest, subject to the ;ame
remedies on such bond, agreement or covenant, for a specific performance or otherwise,
against the devisees or legatees, as might be had by law against the heirs of the testator,
or his next of kin, if the same had descended to them.").
16. Knight v. Weatherwax, supra note 15.
17. E. g., In re Erskine's Estate, 84 Cal. App.2d 323, 190 P.2d 659 (1948); Chadwick
i. Taten, 9 Mont. 354, 23 Pac. 729 (1890); Sells v. Needles, 78 Ohio App. 251, 69
N.E.2d 770 (1946); Washington Escrow Co. v. McKinnon, 40 Wash.2d 423, 243 P.2d
1044 (1952). Contra, Ostrander v. Davis, 191 Fed. 156 (8th Cir. 1911). (This court con-
strued South Dakota statutes identical to N. D. Rev. Code §§ 56-0411, 56-0414 (1943)
and reached the opposite result from the instant case.)
18. N. D. Rev. Code § 56-0401 (1943). ("Except as is otherwise provided in this
chapter, a written will, in whole or part, can be revoked or altered only: 1. By a written
will or other writing of the testator, declaring such revocation or alteration and executed
with the same formalities with which a will should be executed by such testator; or 2. By
being burnt, torn, canceled, obliterated, or destroyed, with the intent and for the purpose
ot revoking the'same, by the testator himself or by some other person in his presence and
by his direction.")
19. N. Y. Decedent Estate Law § 34 (1950).
20. Wills Act, 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26 § 20.
21. Ford v. De Pontes, 30 Beav. 572, 54 Eng. Rep. 1012, 1020 (dictum).
22. 11 N. D.'556, 93 N.W. 862 (1903).
23. See, Thompson Yards v. Bunde, 50 N. D. 408, 196 N.W. 312 (1923); (Buildings
placed on land after signing of executory; contract are also deemed personalty under doctrine
of equitable conversion.); Woodward v. McCollum, 16 N. D., 42, 111 N.W. 623 (1907),
(Vendee bears the risk of loss.); Semmler v. Beulah Coal Mining Co., 48 N. D. 1011, 188
N.W. 310, 312 (1922) (The assignee of the vendor has rights of specific performance.)
(dictum).
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proceeds of an executory contract for deed.2 4 The result of such holdings is
that a devisee takes the proceeds from a contract for deed, while in absence
of a will, the next-of-kin succeed to such proceeds as personalty and the heirs
at law receive the bare security title.
PAUL J. PFEUsSTICKER.
24. Williams v. Haddock, 29 N. Y. Supp. 199, 39 N.E. 825 (1895); Berndt v. L usher,
40 Ohio App. 130, 178 N.E. 14 (1931); In re Reid's Estate, 26 Cal. App. 362, 79 P.2d
451 (1938) (dictum); cf. cases cited note 17 supra.
